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Improvident Guilty Pleas and Related Statements:
Inadmissible Evidence at Later Trial
I. INTRODUCTION
Roughly 90 per cent of all criminal convictions in state and
federal courts result from guilty pleas,' the use of which saves
the time, expense, and uncertainty of lengthy trials.2 Many
pleas result from "plea bargaining" where the accused enters a
plea of guilty in exchange for a reduced charge or a favorable
sentence recommendation by the prosecutor. 3 Even if there are
no actual negotiations, the plea may be the result of a "tacit
bargain" where the accused is aware that the court is generally
more lenient to those who plead guilty.4
There are, however, inherent dangers in the judicial practice
of accepting pleas of guilty. The secrecy and informality present
in the current system of nontrial disposition encourages prosecu-
torial coercion and overreaching.5 It is unlikely that such abuse
1. D. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR
INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRTAL 1 (1966) [hereinafter cited as CONVICTION];
THE PRESIDENT'S COmmISSION ON LAW ENFORCEIENT AND ADMINISTRA-
TiON OF JuSTIcE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 9 (1967) [hereinafter
cited as THE COURTS].
2. CoNVIcTION at 29; L. ORFImLD, CRMvNAL PROCEDURE FROM AR-
REST To APPEAL 297-300 (1947). If all cases went to trial, it would be
far too great a number for the present judicial system to handle. H.
LummUs, TE TRAr. JUDGE 46 (1937); Note, Guilty Plea Bargaining:
Compromises by Prosecutors to Secure Guilty Pleas, 112 U. PA. L. REv.
865, 881 (1964).
3. THE COURTS at 9. Another situation in which defendant may
prefer to have the charge against him changed is where the original
charge has a prescribed sentence and, therefore, the judge has no dis-
cretion to be lenient with him. Id. at 11-12. See, e.g., State v. Os-
good, 266 Minn. 315, 123 N.W. 2d 593 (1963).
4. Enker, Perspectives on Plea Bargaining, in TnE COURTS 108, 111
[hereinafter cited as Enker]. There is every indication that many
judges do look favorably upon a defendant who not only saves the
state the time and expense of a full trial, but by his action indicates
he is repentant of his criminal behavior. See CoNwcTioN at 29; Note,
The Influence of the Defendant's Plea on Judicial Determination of
Sentence, 66 YALE L.J. 204, 209-10 (1956). Leniency is awarded not
only because such pleas minimize the number of trials, but also because
it is thought that a lesser sentence is sufficient as to one who acknowl-
edges his guilt and agrees to forego possible defenses in order to re-
ceive the punishment which may be imposed. See Pilot Institute on
Sentencing, 26 F.R.D. 231, 288-89 (1959).
5. THE COURTS at 9. For recent discussions of the dangers in-
volved in negotiated pleas see Enker passim.. See also Comment, 19
STAN. L. REV. 1082 (1967).
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can be corrected by the judge, since the defendant will not want
to jeopardize his position by revealing the fact or character of the
bargain.6 Furthermore, the state's position may be inadequately
represented, either because of a lack of prosecutorial diligence
veiled by the secrecy surrounding the plea or because of an
absence of all relevant facts at the time of the bargain.7 In
addition, the defendant may plead guilty to a crime of which he
is innocent because of an erroneous belief that his conduct consti-
tutes the crime charged."
Whenever a plea of guilty is tendered, a danger exists that
the accused is unaware of his constitutional rights. Since the
plea is a waiver of defendant's right to trial, he should be fully
advised of this right before the plea.9 Likewise, the accused
should be made aware of his right to counsel when he tenders
his plea.10 Additionally, the danger exists that the confession of
guilt by a plea was induced by some form of state misconduct"
or was the result of a previous involuntary confession 2 or illegal
seizure of evidence.' 3 In spite of the above dangers, many juris-
6. THE COURTS at 9.
7. For a discussion of the problems facing the prosecutor in bal-
ancing the interests of the state and of the defendant see Mills, The
Prosecutor: Charging and "Bargaining," 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 511, 514-16.
8. See State ex rel. Dehning v. Rigg, 251 Minn. 120, 86 N.W.2d 723
(1957); CoNVIcTIoN at 23-24; Committee on Rules of Practice and Pro-
cedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States, 34 F.R.D. 411, 418
(1964).
9. People v. Ballheimer, 37 Ill. 2d 24, 224 N.E.2d 811 (1967);
State v. Clifford, 267 Minn. 554, 126 N.W.2d 258 (1964). For a discus-
sion of what constitutes a valid waiver of trial see Comment, Official
Inducements to Plead Guilty: Suggested Morals for a Marketplace, 32
U. Cm. L. REv. 167 (1964).
10. White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963); Rollins v. State, 194
So. 2d 247 (Fla. 1967). Where defendant is represented by counsel it is
sometimes presumed he has been advised of his rights and the conse-
quences that follow his plea. State ex rel. Rankin v. Tahash, 276 Minn.
97, 149 N.W.2d 12 (1967). But see United States v. Davis, 212 F.2d 264,
267 (7th Cir. 1954).
11. A "guilty plea, if induced by promises or threats which de-
prive it of the character of a voluntary act, is void." Machibroda v.
United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493 (1962). In Machibroda the prosecutor
had promised defendant no more than 20 years if he pleaded guilty.
Defendant, represented by counsel, so pleaded and was sentenced to 40
years.
12. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Cuevas v. Rundle, 258 F. Supp.
647 (E.D. Pa. 1966). An extorted confession is often the white flag of
surrender which precedes the guilty plea. Kamisar, What is an "In-
voluntary" Confession?, 17 RUTGms L. REv. 728, 735 (1963).
13. Many courts follow the theory that the plea of guilty waives
all defects not jurisdictional or that since the illegal evidence was not
used against him the defendant has no complaint and they deny defend-
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dictions have traditionally encouraged informality by requiring
only that the guilty plea be entered voluntarily by a competent
defendant. 14 More recently, however, some courts have begun
to grant official sanction to plea bargaining15 and many have
recognized the need for a more formal and complete inquiry of
the defendant.'
In light of the dangers which presently exist in the adninis-
tration of plea bargains, it is not surprising that many such pleas
are attempted to be withdrawn. Absent a statute giving the
defendant the absolute right of withdrawal, such right is sub-
ject to the discretion of the court. 7 Generally, the ground upon
which a court will find an improvident plea and allow with-
drawal is one where the dangers inherent in accepting such a
plea are present. If the plea were entered in ignorance or mistake
as to its effect,'8 or if the defendant was not made aware of his
right to counsel or other constitutional rights, 9 withdrawal will
dant's request to withdraw the plea. E.g., Mahler v. United States, 333
F.2d 472 (10th Cir. 1964); People v. Deweese, 27 :11. 2d 332, 189 N.E.
2d 247 (1963); Churchill v. Haskins, 176 Ohio St. 183, 198 N.E.2d 656!
(1964). However, such rationales must be premised on the belief that
the plea was in fact a voluntary waiver, that is, the defendant was
aware that he could move to suppress any illegal evidence before
he entered his plea. See State v. Poelakker, 276 Minn. 41, 148 N.W.2d
372 (1967).
14. CoNVIcTioN at 8.
15. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, __ Minn. _, 156 N.W.2d 218 (1968);
State v. Carreau, 182 Neb. 295, 154 N.W.2d 215 (1967). In Johnson
the court held that plea bargaining is not in conflict with public
policy if (1) defendant is represented by counsel; (2) the plea is en-
tered by defendant himself in open court; (3) any reduction in a crim-
inal charge is not unreasonably related to defendant's conduct; and
(4) the court is satisfied that there is a factual basis for the plea of
guilty. Therefore, although the court is not to participate in the bar-
gaining agreement itself, it should make a discrete inquiry into the
propriety of the settlement it is asked to accept.
16. See CoNWcT oN at 20-24. A federal court is now required by
FED. R. CRImi. P. 11 to satisfy itself that the facts support the plea
rather than just determine whether it was entered voluntarily and in-
telligently. See generally Note, The Trial Judge's Satisfaction as to
the Factual Basis of Guilty Pleas, 1966 WAsH. U.L.Q. 306.
17. Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220 (1927); State v.
Jones, 234 Minn. 438, 48 N.W.2d 662 (1951). See generally Annot., 66
A.L.R. 628 (1930).
18. See Commonwealth v. Phelan, 427 Pa. 265, 234 A.2d 540 (1967).
The court in State v. Jones, 267 Minn. 421, 127 N.W.2d 153 (1964), stated
that since a plea of guilty is a confession in open court, it must be re-
ceived with caution. It should not be accepted unless defendant has
been advised of the nature and elements of the crime charged and
doubt extinguished as to whether the plea was made with intelligence
and understanding.
19. See ABA, PROJECT ON MINMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMVINAL
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be permitted. Upon the granting of a motion to withdraw, the
case proceeds to trial for a determination on the merits. The is-
sue then raised is whether the state can introduce as evidence
the former plea, or admissions by the defendant made during
post-plea interrogations.
This Note will analyze the judicial attitude toward the use
of a withdrawn plea as evidence at the subsequent trial and will
then discuss whether a distinction should be drawn between the
plea itself and the admissions made by the defendant during
official inquiries prior to and after sentencing. With some excep-
tions, the Note will advocate the inadmissibility of both the plea
and the related admissions and advance constitutional rationales
for such treatment.
II. INADMISSIBILITY OF THE WITHDRAWN PLEA OF
GUILTY
The accused's guilty plea operates both as a waiver of trial
and as an admission of guilt.20 It is well recognized that evidence
of an admission is receivable against the admitter for the truth
of the matter asserted.21 An exception exists for confessions or
incriminating admissions22 which result from coercion or mis-
conduct on the part of the state.23 Even if deemed voluntary,
such a confession is not conclusive as to the guilt of the defend-
ant; it must be corroborated by other evidence.24 However, the
following discussion will show that most courts treat the with-
drawn plea unlike extra-judicial confessions.
JUsTIcE, STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GuILTY § 2.1 (Tentative
Draft, 1967) [hereinafter cited as A13A STANDARDS]. See generally
Annot., 66 A.L.R. 628 (1930) and notes 5-13 supra, and accompanying
text.
20. E.g., Hoover v. United States, 268 F.2d 787, 790 (1Oth Cir.
1959); State ex rel. Schuler v. Tahash, 278 Minn. 302, 154 N.W.2d 200
(1967).
21. E.g., Litman v. Peper, 214 Minn. 127, 7 N.W.2d 334 (1943).
In such a case the hearsay rule is not applicable. 4 J. WIGMORE,
EviDENcs § 1048 (3d ed. 1940).
22. In regard to admissibility as evidence, there is to be no dis-
tinction made between a confession and an incriminating admission.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966); State v. Jones, 65 Wash.
2d 449, 455, 397 P.2d 815, 819 (1964).
23. See United States v. Drummond, 354 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1013 (1966); State v. Hoyt, 21 Wis. 2d 310, 124
N.W.2d 47 (1963); Kamisar, supra note 12. If a court deems a con-
fession voluntary it will be admitted as evidence. See, e.g., State v.
Schabert, 218 Minn. 1, 15 N.W.2d 585 (1944).
24. State v. Carta, 90 Conn. 79, 96 A. 411 (1916); State v. Voss,
192 Minn. 127, 255 N.W. 843 (1934).
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A. RATIONALE LACKING CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTIFICATION
The majority of states hold that a withdrawn plea of guilty
is inadmissible as evidence at the subsequent trial.25 Although
different reasons for the rule have been stated,26 it can be said
that the primary reason for exclusion is based on the considera-
tions set out in the federal case of Kercheval v. United States.27
Here it was stated that the trial judge should withdraw a plea
only if it were shown that the plea was "unfairly obtained or
given through ignorance, fear, or inadvertence. '28  The court
then held that the admission of a withdrawn guilty plea was
reversible error, on the grounds that an order of withdrawal
annulled the plea for all purposes.29 The court reasoned that the
plea's admission would deprive the defendant of any advantage
gained by the withdrawal and would have the effect of restoring
him to a position of inevitable conviction at the hands of the
jury.30
The type of error in Kercheval is usually considered too
prejudicial to be cured by instructions to the jury.31 It would
therefore seem that a new trial should also be ordered if the
prosecutor comments on the improvident plea32 or informs the
jury of the plea by innuendo. 33
25. See, e.g., State v. Anderson, 173 Minn. 293, 217 N.W. 351
(1927). See generally Annot., 86 A.L.R.2d 326 (1962). The recent cases
squarely confronted with the issue have followed the majority view
and overruled former cases if necessary. See People v. Quinn, 61 Cal.
2d 551, 393 P.2d 705, 39 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1964); People v. Spitaleri, 9
N.Y.2d 168, 173 N.E.2d 35, 212 N.Y.S.2d 53 (1961); State v. Thompson,
203 Ore. 1, 278 P.2d 142 (1954); cf. State v. Wright, 5 Ariz. App. 357,
427 P.2d 338 (1967).
26. See People v. Quinn, 61 Cal. 2d 551, 555 n.2, 393 P.2d 705, 708
n.2, 39 Cal. Rptr. 393, 396 n.2 (1964).
27. 274 U.S. 220 (1927).
28. Id. at 224.
29. Id. "If this means that it ceases to be admissible, the state-
ment may be sound, but otherwise it is hard to see how the evidential
value of a statement once made is nullified by the happening of subse-
quent events." Comment, 3 Ann. L. REV. 471, 472 (1949).
30. See Heim v. United States, 47 App. D.C. 485, 1918E L.R.A. 87,
cert. denied, 247 U.S. 522 (1918); White v. State, 51 Ga. 285 (1874).
31. See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 202 F.2d 521 (6th Cir. 1953);
People v. Haycraft, 76 Ill. App. 2d 149, 221 N.E.2d 317 (1966); People v.
Street, 288 Mich. 406, 284 N.W. 926 (1939); Blankenship v. State, 410
S.W.2d 159 (Tenn. 1966). Contra, State v. Weekly, 41 Wash. 2d 727, 252
P.2d 246 (1952). But in Weekly it would not have been error to over-
rule the objection to the use of the evidence.
32. People v. Street, 288 Mich. 406, 284 N.W. 926 (1939).
33. State v. Reardon, 245 Minn. 509, 73 N.W.2d 192 (1955).
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B. THE NEED FOR CONSTITUTIONAL SANCTITY
Although the majority of states34 protect the accused from
use of the withdrawn plea as evidence, in a minority of states
the accused is not so safeguarded. These states have treated
the withdrawn plea as an extra-judicial confession and allowed
its admission 5 on the presumption that the plea was voluntarily
entered.36 Of course, the plea is not conclusive on the question
of guilt, other corroborative evidence being required.37 However,
its inherently damaging aspects are overwhelming and obvious.
Indeed, the minority position may violate today's constitutional
standards.38 The voluntariness of a confession must first be
determined by the judge sitting without a jury.39 The burden
of proving that a confession was voluntarily entered is on the
government.40  Therefore, a presumption to that effect places
this burden on the accused,41 depriving him of this fundamental
right. If the minority view is to have validity at all it should
require an explicit finding that the plea was entered voluntarily.
To the extent the minority position remains law, constitutional
sanctity is necessary to insure the defendant's protection in the
state courts.
Such need is also present in the federal courts. In United
States ex rel. McKeithan v. Fay,42 where the jury was told of
defendant's prior improvident plea, it was held that the exclu-
sionary rule of Kercheval was based on a rule of evidence rather
than on a constitutional right. The state appellate court had
ruled that the use of the plea was error, but held that no new
trial was necessary in view of the overwhelming independent
34. See note 25 supra.
35. See, e.g., State v. Carta, 90 Corn. 79, 96 A. 411 (1916); State v.
Bringgold, 40 Wash. 12, 82 P. 132 (1905). For additional cases see
Annot., 86 A.L.R.2d, 326, 329 (1962).
36. State v. Carta, 90 Conn. 79, 96 A. 411 (1916).
37. Id.
38. But see Canizio v. New York, 327 U.S. 82, 86 n.2 (1946), where
the Court implies that there is no constitutional objection to the use of
a withdrawn plea as evidence if the defendant was represented by
counsel when the plea was entered.
39. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964); State ex rel. Rasmussen
v. Tahash, 272 Mlinn. 539, 141 N.W.2d 3 (1965).
40. See Domenica v. United States, 292 F.2d 483 (1st Cir. 1961);
People v. Ziegler, 358 Mich. 355, 110 N.W.2d 456 (1960). This is gener-
ally the rule as to extra-judicial confessions. See cases cited in 23
C.J.S. Criminal Law § 835 (1961).
41. See United States ex rel. Spears v. Rundle, 268 F. Supp. 691,
698 (1967) where the opposite presumption was drawn.
42. 219 F. Supp. 779 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
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evidence against the defendant.43  Thus, where independent
evidence of guilt is sufficiently strong,44 use of the improvident
plea will merely be harmless error and the accused will go un-
protected. The fact that there is "no more solemn confession of
criminality than that involved in... a judicial answer to charg-
es' 45 and that it is highly unlikely the jury will, even if in-
structed, ignore the evidence,46 clearly indicates the need for con-
stitutional protection. In addition, McKeithan's failure to find
a constitutional ground deprives the defendant of any federal
question to allow collateral attack in a federal habeas corpus
action.4
7
C. CONsTrTUTIoNAL CONCEPTS FOR EXCLUSION: FIFTH AMENDMENT
Two different grounds have been judicially advanced to give
the majority rule constitutional sanctity. One is that any use of
the plea is a violation of the privilege against self-incrimination.
The other is that any use of the plea is violative of due process.
The following discussion will analyze the judicial opinions which
advance these views and submit other constitutional rationales.
Two courts have found the plea's entry to be a violation of
the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The
first was Wood v. United States48 which involved a preliminary
hearing49 at which the presiding magistrate had no authority to
request or accept a plea of guilty. Here, it was held that the use
43. People v. McKeithan, 14 App. Div. 2d 916, 223 N.Y.S.2d 707
(1961), affd mem., 12 N.Y.2d 718, 186 N.E.2d 127, 233 N.Y.S.2d 770
(1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 971 (1963).
44. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex tel. Ashmon v. Banmiller, 391 Pa.
141, 137 A.2d 236, cert. denied, 356 U.S. 945 (1958); Commonwealth v.
Chavis, 357 Pa.158, 53 A.2d 96, cert. denied, 332 U.S. 811 (1947).
45. United States v. Stivers, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 315, 318, 30 C.M.R. 315,
318 (1961).
46. See People v. Haycraft, 76 Ill. App. 2d 149, 221 N.E.2d 317
(1966); cf. Bruten v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
47. The criminal defendant's remedy on any federal question after
state remedies have been fully pursued is not limited to a review by the
United States Supreme Court. He can collaterally attack the state's
ruling by a habeas corpus action in a federal district court. This re-
view is not limited to the state record or necessarily bound by state
procedural rules governing the assertion of federal questions. Meador,
The Impact of Federal Habeas Corpus on State Trial Procedures, 52 VA.
L. REV. 286 ( 1966).
48. 128 F.2d 265 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
49. The purpose of a preliminary hearing is to determine whether
an offense has been committed and whether there is probable cause to
believe that the accused is the offending party. State eX Tel. Welper v.
Rigg, 254 Minn. 10, 93 N.W.2d 198 (1958).
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of the plea violates the privilege against self-incrimination be-
cause the defendant was "compelled" to speak without being in-
formed of his right to remain silent,51 or his right to counsel. 52
The court reasoned that the function of the plea was to decide
whether there is a contest-whether the Government must put
forward its proof; it was neither given by the defendant, nor
accepted by the court, for any evidential reason. The court
argued that the plea's admission constituted a judicial gathering
of evidence against the defendant, contrary to the policy of the
privilege which demands that the court play a neutral role. 3
Since the plea was not evidential and since the courts cannot
force a defendant to swear to his innocence, the allowance of the
plea into evidence forces the defendant to testify against himself.
The court concluded that a plea of guilty is merely a waiver of
trial and does not constitute a waiver of the privilege against
self-incrimination.5 4
The rationale of Wood is less than satisfying and has evi-
dently not been followed.55 The entering of a guilty plea by a
defendant, at least in a practical sense, is a statement by him
that is contrary to his later position of "not guilty."56 It is doubt-
ful that defendants who plead guilty realize they are merely
waiving trial,57 and not admitting that they actually did the acts
50. 128 F.2d at 278; see People v. Jackson, 23 Ill. 2d 263, 178 N.E.2d
310 (1961).
51. This is undoubtedly correct today under the rule of Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
52. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) found a sixth amendment
violation if the accused had not waived his right to counsel when the
plea was asked for or accepted.
53. One policy of the privilege is "that the courts shall not play
... favorites with the prosecution or . .. aid in performing its func-
tions." 128 F.2d at 275.
54. Id. Accord, Knox v. State, 234 Md. 203, 208, 198 A.2d 285, 287
(1964) (dissenting opinion). But see note 108 infra.
55. It is interesting to note that Xustice Rutledge, who wrote the
Wood opinion, was unable to influence the Supreme Court toward his
view of the issue. See Canizio v. New York, 327 U.S. 82, 91 (1946)
(Rutledge, J., dissenting). But see State v. Wright, Ariz. App. 357,
362, 427 P.2d 338, 343 (1967) (dissenting opinion), which agrees with
Wood.
56. See Johnson v. United States, 254 F.2d 239, 241 (8th Cir. 1958)
where the court states that the plea is an admission of the facts charged
in the indictment and an accused cannot later be heard to say that no
evidence was offered against him.
57. Morgan, The Law of Evidence, 1941-45, 59 HARv. L. REv. 481,
525 (1946); Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 34 M=.
L. REv. 1, 26 (1949). In the latter article Professor Morgan outlines the
history of the privilege and states that no English court ever dreamed
it was a violation of the privilege to use physical force to make a de-
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charged.5 s However, the only issue before the Wood court was a
plea entered at a preliminary hearing where the accused had not
been advised of his constitutional rights, including his right to
remain silent.
In a habeas corpus action the court in United States ex rel.
Spears v. Rundle59 also held that the use of defendant's with-
drawn plea violated the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. ° A defendant can not be ordered to take the
stand during trial to be questioned as to his guilt, and, according
to the Spears court, the use of the improvident plea as evidence,
in effect, forces him to do just that. Defendant must either take
the stand and explain why he made the plea in the first instance,
or suffer from the adverse inference likely to be drawn by not so
explaining.6 1 In dealing with the issue of whether or not the
plea waived the privilege, the court suggested that if the plea
waives the privilege, the later withdrawal of the plea withdraws
the waiver. 62 The court, however, bypassed the issue by looking
at the facts and circumstances surrounding the entry of the plea,
and presumed the withdrawal was granted because the plea was
not voluntarily made. Since the privilege cannot be involuntar-
ily or unknowingly waived, no waiver existed to be considered. 63
Although the relief granted the defendant in Spears is com-
mendable, the rationale given is subject to criticism for ignoring
a major objection to the use of the plea as evidence-it is too
prejudicial to be corrected by jury instructions.64 The same is
certainly true of any explanation defendant may give if he takes
the stand. Unfortunately the Spears court, believing the use of
the plea to be unfair, had no authority to grant relief and there-
fore chose a rather tenuous fifth amendment objection as its
ground for granting relief. Perhaps this is best illustrated by its
concluding statement on the issue: "The internal inconsistency
within a court which on the one hand permits a guilty plea to
fendant say "guilty" or "not guilty." Today he can stand mute and a
plea of not guilty is entered for him. 34 MINN. L. REv. at 26.
58. Whether they actually did the acts or not is irrelevant to what
they suppose they are saying. That is, in a negotiated plea they may
be "saying" they did acts less serious than they actually did, or in a
minor offense they may be "admitting" acts they never did rather than
bother with the time and expense of trial.
59. 268 F. Supp. 691 (1967).
60. Id. at 699.
61. Id. at 698-99.
62. Id. at 699.
63. Id.
64. See People v. Haycraft, 76 IlM. App. 2d 149, 153, 221 N.E.2d 317,
319 (1966); cf. Bruten v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
19691
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be withdrawn, and on the other permits it to be used as evidence,
entraps an unwary defendant and cannot be tolerated."0' 5 This
language shows that the court was basically concerned with prej-
udice against the defendant when the plea is used as evidence;
however, it properly tried to find error in the means used to ob-
tain the evidence.
There is an inherent problem created if the privilege against
self-incrimination is relied upon to exclude the plea from evi-
dence. Even if it is true that the improvident plea fails to waive
the privilege because not given voluntarily or intelligently by the
defendant, this may be an insufficient ground on which to base
the exclusion. At present the exclusion of good evidence occurs
only when the evidence is obtained by state conduct violative of
the constitution and this conduct is sought to be deterred by
excluding such evidence. 60 Although deterrable conduct exists
when the plea is coerced, if the waiver is ineffective merely be-
cause the accused is not sufficiently aware of his predicament
to make an intelligent choice, misconduct is wanting and thus
there seems no reason to invoke the exclusionary rule.
D. DUE PROCESs GRoUNDs
Other courts have found the use of the plea to be a violation
of due process. In State v. Reardon67 the prosecutor mentioned
a withdrawn plea in closing argument and the defendant was
convicted. Although Minnesota had already adhered to the ma-
jority rule,68 the Reardon court expressly decided that comment
on the withdrawn plea violated the due process of law guar-
anteed by both the Minnesota Constitution and the fourteenth
amendment.6 9 The court noted that a plea of guilty is hardly
synonymous with an extra-judicial admission, the plea being a
conclusive admission of guilt leaving the court only to pass sen-
tence.70 The prejudice to the defendant resulting from jury
knowledge of his improvident plea was too great for cure by
jury instructions,71 and the existence of independent evidence
sufficient to convict was irrelevant since the constitutional right
65. 268 F. Supp. 691, 700 (1967) (emphasis added).
66. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961); Rogers v. Rich-
mond, 365 U.S. 534, 540-41 (1961).
67. 245 Minn. 509, 73 N.W.2d 192 (1955).
68. See State v. Anderson, 173 Minn. 293, 217 N.W. 351 (1927) and
notes 51 & 52 supra, and accompanying text.
69. 245 Minn. at 513, 73 N.W.2d at 195.
70. Id. at 511, 73 N.W.2d at 193.
71. Id. at 513, 73 N.W.2d at 195.
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to a fair trial is too basic a right "to allow factually strong cases
to erode it .... ",72
In State v. Joyner73 constitutional sanctity was again given
the rule which excludes from evidence a withdrawn plea of
guilty, as the court stated the majority view is "sound and more
consonant with our concept of the constitutional rights of the ac-
cused. '7 4 The gist of the Joyner rationale is that an accused is
presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. If the state is allowed to show the highly prejudicial
improvident plea, the presumption of innocence is destroyed.75
Although the court does not state the constitutional concept upon
which its decision is based, it seems likely that if the presumption
of innocence is to be given constitutional sanctity, such sanctity
falls under due process.7 6
Reardon and Joyner provide a constitutional rationale for
the rule excluding the plea from evidence, both decisions seem
to center on the prejudice to the defendant when the plea is
used against him at trial. Since it should not be error to use
the evidence unless there was error in obtaining the evidence,
it seems appropriate for the court to find and set out such er-
ror. This is apparent when one considers that a guilty plea
should not be withdrawn unless the defendant establishes, to
the court's satisfaction, that withdrawal is necessary to cor-
rect a "manifest injustice."77 Although there are a number
of reasons7 8 why a court may allow a withdrawal after finding
that a manifest injustice was committed,79 after the plea is with-
72. Id. at 514, 73 N.W.2d at 195.
73. 228 La. 927, 84 So. 2d 462 (1955).
74. Id. at 930, 84 So. 2d at 463 (emphasis added). For an almost
identical holding, see People v. Hayeraft, 76 Ill. App. 2d 149, 221 N.E.2d
317 (1966).
75. Accord, State v. Wright, 5 Ariz. App. 357, 427 P. 338 (1967).
76. Cf. McFarland v. American Sugar Refining Co., 241 U.S. 79, 86
(1916); McNeilly v. State, 119 N.J.L. 237, 195 A. 725 (1937).
77. ABA STANnARDs, § 2.1. See also note 17 supra, and accom-
panying text.
78. See Chapman v. Minnesota, - N.W.2d - (Minn. Nov. 1, 1968).
79. Withdrawal is ordered by a court because it believes the plea
was the result of circumstances which were unfair to the defendant.
The plea may have been the result of the prosecutor making false prom-
ises. See, e.g., Dillon v. United States, 307 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1962);
cf. United States ex rel. Cuevas v. Rundle, 258 F. Supp. 647 (E.D. Pa.
1966). Also, the defendant may have entered his plea before he made
an effective waiver of his right to counsel. See note 10 supra, and
accompanying text. However, where there is no undue influence and
where the defendant is aware of and understands his constitutional
rights when the plea is entered, the unfairness resulting in withdrawal
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drawn it should make no difference what the reason was. If the
injustice to the defendant was sufficient to grant withdrawal, it
should be sufficient to deny admission of the withdrawn plea at
the subsequent trial. Obviously, the withdrawal fails to remedy
the injustice completely if the plea is subsequently allowed to be
used as evidence.
E. SUGGESTED RATIONALE
Clear constitutional concepts can now be expressed. On the
one hand, if the plea is used at trial the defendant has incrimi-
nated himself, which must not happen unless the defendant has
made a valid waiver of his fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination. On the other hand, it can be said that a guilty
plea is a waiver of a defendant's constitutional right to a trial,8 0
such a waiver being ineffective if the plea is withdrawn. A con-
stitutional right cannot be waived unless it is done freely and
intelligently.81 A guilty plea is allowed to be withdrawn either
because the court believes the state unfairly induced the plea
or because the defendant was not sufficiently cognizant of his
legal position to make an intelligent decision. Either way there
has been an invalid waiver of constitutional rights.
However, it should again be noted that the basic reason for
suppressing an incriminating admission or confession, where
there is no reason to doubt the truthfulness thereof, is to deter
the state from engaging in the type of conduct which brought
about the admission.8 2 Some pleas may have been tendered
is difficult to explain. In such a case the withdrawal is likely allowed
because the court believes the defendant was not sufficiently aware of
either the effect of the plea or his legal position. See, e.g., Kotz v.
United States, 353 F.2d 312, 314 (8th Cir. 1965). The defendant's lack
of understanding is important because, but for the guilty plea, he would
have gone to trial where the burden of proving his guilt is on the
state and his own comprehension of his legal position is relatively
unimportant in determining whether or not he will be convicted.
80. It could hardly be contended that the due process clause does
not grant all citizens accused of committing a crime the right to demand
a fair trial. In fact, the Supreme Court has recently held that, in ac-
cordance with the sixth amendment, a state must grant a jury trial to a
person accused of more than a petty offense, unless such a trial is
waived. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
81. Cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 465, 469 (1966).
82. Harrison v. United States, 392 'U.S. 219, 228 (1968) (dissenting
opinion); see Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 634-39 (1965).
However, the Supreme Court has indicated there is more than just
deterrence behind suppression of certain evidence. It is "imperative ofjudicial integrity" that no court allow evidence to be used which was
obtained in violation of the laws or Constitution of the United States.
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because of undue duress or false promises on the part of the
state and such conduct should be deterred. In addition, many
pleas are withdrawn because the defendant was not sufficiently
advised to make an intelligent decision to so plead. Arguably
it should be the affirmative duty of the court to make sufficient
inquiry before accepting the plea in order to determine whether
the defendant is cognizant of all the circumstances confronting
him.s 3 If a breach of this duty can be said to be deterrable con-
duct, then protection would always be found, as all improvident
pleas would result either from undue influence or from an insuf-
ficient inquiry. However, it is likely that proper judicial conduct
can be encouraged by means other than exclusion of good evi-
dence. Furthermore, an insufficient inquiry is obviously no rea-
son to exclude an offer to plead guilty which was rejected by the
court.8 4 Yet, the introduction into evidence of an offer to plead
guilty would likely be as damaging to a defendant as a withdrawn
plea, and, if a court does not allow a withdrawn plea to be used,
neither should it allow the use of a rejected plea.8 5
Lee v. Florida, 392 U.S. 378, 385-86 (1968). In two recent cases sup-
pression was ordered where deterrence could not reasonably have been
a strong factor. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968); Har-
rison v. United States, supra.
83. In United States ex rel. Thurmond v. Mancusi, 275 F. Supp.
508, 514-19 (E.D.N.Y. 1967), it was held that due process requires a
fair procedure in the state courts surrounding the acceptance of a guilty
plea. A fair procedure requires a reasonable assurance that (1) there
is a factual basis for a finding of guilt and (2) that the plea is voluntary.
That is, the defendant must understand the significance of what he is
doing and his ability to choose the course best serving his needs must
not be unduly distorted by his predicament. A searching inquiry by the
court is the most efficient means of meeting the due process requirement;
even if the defendant is represented by counsel, a cursory examination
will not suffice.
84. The Supreme Court recently denied certiorari to a case where
the state court held that the admission of an out-of-court offer to a
prosecutor to plead guilty was harmless error. Three Justices dissented
to the denial of certiorari. After stating that the defendant could not be
expected to overcome the prejudice resulting from the admission of such
evidence, the dissent concluded:
We should consider whether we should not, in any event,
prohibit the use of a statement made for bargaining purposes.
We should not attach such a penalty to discussion of the pos-
sibility of a guilty plea. The general rule is that such evidence
would not be admissible in a civil suit even where the stake is
as little as a few dollars. We should at least consider the bear-
ing of the practice upon the constitutional guarantee of a fair
trial where the issue is murder and the possible penalty is
death.
Hamilton v. California, 389 U.S. 921, 922 (1968) (emphasis added).
85. See State v. McGunn, 208 Minn. 349, 294 N.W. 208 (1940);
Dykes v. State, 213 Tenn. 40, 372 S.W.2d 184 (1963).
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It is submitted that the most appropriate constitutional
rationale for excluding from evidence the withdrawn plea or the
rejected plea of guilty is that the plea's admission at trial de-
prives the defendant of his constitutional right to a fair and
impartial trial by reducing the state's burden of gathering evi-
dence and proving any guilt beyond a resonable doubt.80 This
rationale finds support in the very policy behind the majority
rule which excludes the improvident plea from evidence-that to
use the plea as evidence deprives the defendant of any advantage
gained by the withdrawal.8 7 However, it goes further in explain-
ing the unfairness of obtaining the plea in the first instance-the
plea was obtained as a result of an ineffective waiver of trial.
This ineffective waiver was the result of an attempt by the de-
fendant to obtain a means of adjudication made available by the
state as an alternative to his constitutional right to a fair and
impartial trial with the full burden of proof on the state. When
this alternative adjudication is not used 8 the state must give
to the defendant all rights and incidents to the trial he would
have possessed if the ineffective waiver of trial had not occurred.
An analogy to the above theory can be found in a recent
Minnesota case which held that a bargained plea must be with-
drawn if the prosecutor does not fulfill his promise. Failure to
do so, according to the court, deprives the defendant the pre-
sumption of innocence and his right to a jury trial.8 9
Underlying this reasoning is a recognition of the adversary na-
ture of our system of criminal justice. This system rests on
the basic assumptions that every person accused of a crime is
presumed innocent and that his legal guilt must be established
in an adversary proceeding in which the state has the burden of
proof. Thus, an accused, despite his own feeling concerning his
guilt or his apparent guilt in the eyes of law enforcement offi-
cials, the victim, or others, has the unqualified right to elect to
stand trial and to receive the aid of counsel .... 90
The court could well have expressed its view in terms of a
waiver. An effective waiver of a constitutional right can only
occur where the accused speaks after becoming aware of the
86. Due process puts the full burden of proof on the state. Cf.
McFarland v. American Sugar Refining Co., 241 U.S. 79, 86 (1916); Mc-
Neilly v. State, 119 N.J.L. 137, 195 A. 725 (1937).
87. See note 30 supra, and accompanying text.
88. The state has already decided it is unjust to use the alternative
procedure. See note 77 supra, and accompanying text.
89. State v. Wolske, 160 N.W.2d M6 (Minn. 1968). Where an un-
fulfilled promise is the reason for the withdrawal, it may be a more
appropriate remedy for the court to compel performance of the promise
rather than withdraw the plea.
90. Id. at 151.
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right and cognizant of the consequences of foregoing it.91 The
plea of guilty, when obtained without an effective waiver of
trial, must be withdrawn and the defendant given his right to a
trial. However, the reasoning of the Minnesota court, as far as
it went, would seem to support a requirement that any evidence
obtained during an ineffective attempt on the part of the defend-
ant to waive his right to trial be inadmissible. Use of such evi-
dence would deprive the accused of his right to have the burden
of gathering all the evidence on the state.
III. STATEMENTS RESULTING FROM THE
IMPROVIDENT PLEA
The accused will undoubtedly say more than "guilty" after
entering an improvident plea.92 In answering questions put to
him by the court, or by a correction official assigned to his case,
he may make statements which the prosecution might desire to
use against him should the plea subsequently be withdrawn. Al-
though the trend toward a more complete inquiry will cut down
the number of improvident pleas,93 such inquiries give rise to sub-
stantially more damaging statements by the defendant. Even if
it is held that the state cannot use the statements in its case in
chief, there remains the issue as to whether they can utilize them
for impeachment purposes. Also, a distinction might be made
between admissions to the court and admissions to correction of-
ficials. The following will discuss current judicial treatment of
the matter and alternative suggestions.
A. STATEMENTS MADE BEFoRE THE COuRT
In State v. Hook94 the prosecution read almost verbatim most
of the questions the judge had asked defendant when the plea
was entered. Although no direct mention of the plea was made,
the court, holding the statements inadmissible, emphasized that
the manner in which the questions were asked revealed that a
guilty plea had been entered.95 Citing Kercheval, the court said
that the plea, sentence, and judgment were nullified by the
vacating order when the plea was withdrawn and that use of the
91. Cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 (1966).
92. See notes 15-16 supra, and accompanying text.
93. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
94. 174 Mfinn. 590, 219 N.W.2d 926 (1928).
95. ". .. [I]t can be said that no one familiar with court rooms
could believe that the jury did not understand that a plea of guilty
has been entered." Id. at 592, 219 N.W.2d at 927.
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plea, including implicit reference thereto, conflicted with that
order. In indicating that the instant statements implied that a
guilty plea had been entered,96 the court leaves unanswered
whether statements which give no indication that a guilty plea
was entered are admissible.
In accord with Hook is United States v. Long9 7 where the
prosecution introduced into evidence the entire transcript of the
proceeding at which a subsequently withdrawn plea of guilty
had been entered. The court held that since the plea was vacated
by the withdrawing order, it could not be used, even by innuendo,
as evidence.98
In both Hook and Long the jury could understand that a plea
of guilty had been entered and the unfairness in such a case is as
great as where the plea is specifically mentioned. However, the
more difficult issue of whether a related statement can be used
if there is no implication of the prior plea was not answered. If a
statement is used which in no way reveals the entrance of a
guilty plea, the objection that admitting such evidence leaves
the-defendant in no better position than he was before the plea
was withdrawn 9 is less persuasive. One jurisdiction has intro-
duced a policy rationale for excluding all related statements from
evidence. The Court of Military Appeals has held that neither a
stipulation of facts entered with the improvident guilty plea,100
nor statements made by defendant in mitigation prior to sentenc-
ing, 01 can be used against him at a later trial on the ground that
freely given statements are to be encouraged to aid in the imposi-
tion and review of sentences and such encouragement would be
frustrated if these statements could be used against the defend-
ant in the event of trial.102
To determine whether an incriminating statement should be
used against a defendant, it is essential that the circumstances
which prompted the defendant to make the statement be re-
viewed. The statements made in court before and after the
plea's entry would not have been made but for the plea.10 3 It
96. Id.
97. 323 F.2d 468 (6th Cir. 1963).
98. Id. at 472. This was despite the fact that defendant's own
counsel first mentioned the withdrawn plea.
99. See text accompanying note 30 supra.
100. United States v. Daniels, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 52, 28 C.M.R. 276 (1959).
101. United States v. Stivers, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 315, 30 C.M.R. 315
(1961).
102. Id. at 318, 30 C.M.R. at 318.
103. Therefore, if the plea was coerced by state misconduct, per-
haps all resulting statements should be excluded. However, a rationale
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has already been suggested that to use an improvident plea as
evidence would violate defendant's right to a fair trial.104 He
has the right to go to trial unhampered by evidence obtained by
the state as a result of a prior ineffective waiver. Seemingly
this would include statements resulting from official inquiries'0 5
in connection with the improvident plea.
The only distinction between the use of the improvident
plea and the statements is that the statements are often not as
prejudicial. Therefore, it can be argued that the admission of
the statements should constitute only harmless error where suf-
ficient independent evidence of guilt exists. However, the state-
ments frequently reveal that the defendant formerly entered a
plea of guilty. The line between what statements give rise to an
inference of the improvident plea, and what statements do not,
would be difficult to draw. In addition, even the non-revealing
statements prejudice the defendant, as he will not likely be able
to explain them without revealing his guilty plea. Therefore,
the defendant may have to allow a statement to stand uncon-
tested which radiates a stronger inference of guilt than war-
ranted under the circumstances. To discourage any "accidental"
use of the statements by the prosecution, their use should not be
considered harmless error.
The rationale that statements should be excluded from evi-
dence when obtained while the defendant is being encouraged
by the state to accept an alternative procedure to his constitu-
tional right of trial receives indirect support in two recent Su-
preme Court decisions. In Harrison v. United States' ° the Court
held that when a new trial is granted because illegally obtained
confessions were introduced against the defendant, the state can-
not subsequently use defendant's testimonial admissions of the
first trial, unless the state can prove defendant would have made
which excludes the statements whether or not the plea was coerced is
desirable.
104. See text following note 85 supra.
105. When this Note speaks of official inquiries in connection with
the plea it is referring to statements made in court necessary for the
entry of the plea and the imposition of sentence, and to statements to
correction officials which are an immediate result of the plea-usually
the pre-sentence investigation or an application for probation or parole
within a matter of days after sentencing. An application for probation
or parole after defendant has begun serving his sentence, which is too
far removed in time to be considered part of the "overall procedure"
connected with the entry of the plea, is not the "result" of the plea.
This Note does not advocate that such far removed statements should
be excluded from evidence if the plea is subsequently withdrawn.
106. 392 U.S. 219 (1968).
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such admissions even absent the evidential use of the confession.
In Simmons v. United States'0 7 the Court held that state-
ments made by a defendant during a hearing on an unsuccess-
ful motion to suppress evidence, allegedly seized in violation of
the fourth amendment, cannot be used against him at trial. The
Court reasoned that a defendant should in no way be deterred
from seeking his constitutional rights, and it would be grossly
unjust if he had to waive his privilege against self-incrimination
to obtain them.
The greatest significance of Harrison and Simmons lies in the
fact that the basic reason for excluding apparently truthful evi-
dence has been that exclusion is the only practical means of
deterring state agents from obtaining evidence in an unconsti-
tutional manner. Yet it is obvious that the exclusion of the type
of statements involved in the two decisions will provide no mean-
ingful deterrence against the underlying police misconduct. It
would seem that the Court in Harrison was basically concerned
with providing the defendant with a right to a trial unprejudiced
by evidence which would not have been obtained by the state
if all constitutional safeguards had been extended to the defend-
ant immediately. In turn, the Court in Simmons indicates that
defendant's right to a fair trial cannot be diminished by using as
evidence statements he finds necessary to give in an attempt to
gain the protection of a constitutional right. It would seem to
follow that it is also unjust to allow the state substantially to
diminish defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial by using
statements made by defendant when he tried to take advantage
of a state-offered alternative to trial. When the alternative fails
-no effective waiver of trial being made-and it is necessary to
allow defendant his constitutional right to trial belatedly, all
evidence obtained by official state inquiries connected with the
alternative should be excluded.
It can be argued that in-court statements are obtained in
violation of the privilege against self-incrimination. This is based
on a rationale that the state "compelled" the defendant to answer
because it did not appear he was incriminating himself, when, in
fact, he was. It is generally recognized that a party who has
pleaded guilty waives his right to claim the privilege as to the
facts of the crime in question.108 This is because the prosecution
107. 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
108. See, e.g., United States v. Gernie, 252 F.2d 664, 670 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 356 U.S. 968 (1958); Knox v. State, 234 Md. 203, 198 A.2d
285 (1964); State ex rel. Jones v. Tahash, 276 Minn. 188, 149 N.W.2d
270 (1967). Contra, cases cited note 54 supra.
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is over-he cannot incriminate himself further. Therefore, un-
less his answer may reveal a new offense or subject the defend-
ant to prosecution by some other jurisdiction, the defendant must
reply or be held in contempt.109 Since the existence of the plea
allows such compulsion, the plea's withdrawal arguably results
in the defendant having been compelled to incriminate himself
and, therefore, the statements should be excluded." 0
Although there is merit to the above argument, the better
rationale seems to be that the improvident plea of guilty is an
ineffective waiver of trial and therefore it and the resulting
statements should be excluded.-" Not only does that rationale
relieve an "overworked" privilege which perhaps is best limited
to use where official misconduct can be shown, but it more clearly
points out the original unfairness and the desired end-a fair
trial. Also it can be easily extended to official inquiries made
out of court. The following discussion, however, presents a
possible alternative for such inquiries if the rationale is not so
extended.
B. STATEMENTS MADE TO COREcTION OFICIALS
Rather than the court making extensive inquiries of the de-
fendant, subsequent to his guilty plea, to determine an appro-
priate sentence, such inquiries may be made by a state correction
agency."12  In the event the guilty plea is later withdrawn, the
state might desire to have a correction official testify as to any
admissions made to him by the defendant." 3 The admissibility
of this testimony is then in issue.
Apparently the only jurisdiction with reported cases on this
issue is California. There the presence of actual threats or prom-
ises appears to be the controlling factor." 4 In People u. Quinn,115
109. See the statement of facts and holding in Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. 1 (1964).
110. See United States ex rel. Spears v. Rundle, 268 F. Supp. 691,
698 (E.D. Pa. 1967) where the court suggests that if the plea does
waive the privilege, the later withdrawal should remove the effect of
the waiver and reinstate the privilege.
111. However, this does not take away from whatever weight the
rationale may have as to statements after conviction at trial and before
a retrial. See Part IV infra.
112. See MINN. STAT. § 243.49 (Supp. 1967); CONVICTION 14.
113. The issue here is using admissions against defendant for the
substantive crime, as distinct from a hearing to determine if parole or
probation privileges should be granted or revoked.
114. The California Supreme Court has recently added a new re-
quirement-unless it appears affirmatively that a defendant made state-
ments to a probation officer under advice of counsel, or has waived his
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defendant was charged with robbery and unlawful possession of
narcotics. A plea of guilty was entered to the charge of robbery
and a motion for probation was continued for hearing and de-
termination. The defendant was then interviewed by a proba-
tion officer who told the defendant that he would not recommend
probation if he later found that the defendant was not telling
him the truth. Thereafter, the trial court permitted the defend-
ant to withdraw his plea. At the subsequent trial the probation
officer was called as a state witness and revealed, over objection,
what the defendant had told him in the interview.,, On appeal
the court reversed, finding the statements involuntary since they
resulted from the officer's threat and implied promise of leniency.
On the other hand, in People v. Brooks,"7 the court held
differently where defendant had counsel, had been repeatedly
told of his right to remain silent, and had not been coerced by
threats or promises." 8 At trial following a withdrawal of de-
fendant's plea, the officer was allowed to testify as to defendant's
admissions.
It is suggested that if a threat to deny parole or probation
privileges is sufficient to render a defendant's statements invol-
untary, all statements to correction officials should be deemed in-
voluntary. All defendants are likely to believe that failure to
answer questions will result in a denial of any privileges.
In addition, the very nature of the inquiries by correction
officials-presumably made with the intention of helping the de-
fendant rather than gathering evidence against him-make it un-
fair to use defendant's statements against him. Although the
statements were admitted, this unfairness was judicially expres-
sed by another California decision:
Although we find no reason for holding the testimony ... inad-
missible we deplore the use of any admissions of a defendant to
a probation officer as evidence against him in a trial. While the
officer had no reason to warn defendant that his statement
might be used against him in any criminal prosecution, we
think the use of such information to convict the defendant of a
crime is inherently deceptive, to say the least. And it appears
to us that in order to get full cooperation from a defendant he
right to counsel and has been advised of his right to remain silent, the
state cannot use the statements for any purpose. People v. Alesi, 67
Cal. 2d 856, 860-61, 434 P.2d 360, 363, 64 Cal. Rptr. 104, 107 (1967).
115. 61 Cal. 2d 551, 393 P.2d 705, 39 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1964).
116. He also revealed that defendant had pleaded guilty; this was
held to be reversible error.
117. 234 Cal. App. 2d 662, 44 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1965).
118. The court also noted that the admission in no way indicated
that a plea of guilty had been entered. Id. at 683-84, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 674.
[Vol. 53:559
IMPROVIDENT GUILTY PLEAS
should be advised that any statement he makes will be used
only for the information of the court in a probationary hearing.
We do not doubt that defendants have that belief and that if
they knew their damaging admissions could be used against
them in another trial they would not talk freely and the pur-
pose of the interview would be frustrated.119
Perhaps statements to correctional officials should, in light
of the above, be inadmissible on the ground that they are priv-
ileged communications. 120 This rationale is premised on the
purpose of correction agencies being rehabilitative and this ob-
jective being best served by full cooperation from the defendant.
To obtain such cooperation the defendant should feel secure in
believing that the correction agency is there only to help him in
the future, presenting no retributive threat as to past behavior.
It should be remembered that since 90 per cent of all "con-
victions" are by guilty pleas with few ever withdrawn, the "con-
victed" defendant interviewed by a correction official who "may
be incriminating himself" is the exception rather than the rule.
The interest, therefore, in free discussion and rehabilitation of all
criminals should outweigh any interest in using the admissions
against the few criminals who withdraw their plea.
The standards set out by Professor Wigmore for determining
privileged communications seem to embrace these statements to
correction officials:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that
they will not be disclosed.
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full
and satisfactory maintenance of the relations between the
parties.
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the com-
munity ought to be sedulously fostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclos-
ure of the communications must be greater than the bene-
fit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation.12 1
C. USE OF STATEMENTS FOR IMPEACHMENT
Admissions which do not reveal the entry of the guilty plea
are not, on their face, as prejudicial as the plea itself.122 But
119. People v. Garcia, 240 Cal. App. 2d 9, 13, 49 Cal. Rptr. 146, 148
(1966) (emphasis added). The case involved an inquiry after a con-
viction at a trial. However, in this respect, the inquiry after a plea of
guilty is closely analogous.
120. For a discussion of this privilege see Note, Functional Overlap
Between the Lawyer and Other Professionals: Its Implications for the
Privileged Communication Doctrine, 71 YALE L.J. 1226 (1962).
121. 8 J. WIGMom, EViDENCE, § 2285 (McNaughton Rev. 1961).
122. Note that the Court in Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219,
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if they are considered the result of an ineffective waiver of trial,
they should be excluded from evidence regardless. 12 3 However,
it can be said that evidence illegally obtained, which cannot be
used by the prosecution in its case in chief, is not necessarily
forbidden in impeachment. 124 This is especially true if the im-
peachment evidence merely attacks defendant's credibility, rather
than tending to show that defendant did the acts charged.125
However, it would seem that any use of post-plea (or even
post-conviction) statements does create dangers in that they of-
ten hint at the circumstances under which they were given.
They are more harmful to defendant than ordinary pre-indict-
ment admissions as they cannot be explained by the defendant
without the risk of revealing the improvident plea to the jury.
If the defendant makes no explanation, the attack on his cred-
ibility is almost assured of full success. Arguably, therefore,
placing the defendant in this position, which, after all, is due to
an attempt to cooperate with the state, should not be permitted.
The detriment to him is always great, while the value to the
state in attacking his credibility, assuming no other inference,
may often be slight.
IV. ANALOGY TO AFTER-TRIAL STATEMENTS
Since the plea of guilty operates as a conviction, one might
argue that statements made in response to official inquiry after
acceptance of an improvident plea should not be distinguished
from statements made after conviction at trial, but before a re-
trial. In both there will likely be pre-sentence investigations
and interviews by correction officials. In both it is likely that
the defendant does not realize he may be jeopardizing his in-
terests at the time he makes incriminating statements.126 In
both there is about the same degree of "compulsion" to answer.
But for the improvident plea, or the conviction, the statements
would not have been made.
223 n.9 (1968), limited its holding to forbidding the state to use the
first-trial testimony during its case in chief.
123. See text following note 85 supra.
124. See Kent, Miranda v. Arizona-The Use of Inadmissible Evi-
dence for Impeachment Purposes, 18 W. RES. L. REv. 1177 (1967).
125. Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
126. For the purpose of discussion this paper will assume that the
defendant is not planning to make a motion for retrial at the time of
the inquiry, and the fact that he is not will not be held against him.
That is, if the motion for retrial is granted by the state, it has been a
timely motion.
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However, if one believes that the important element in de-
termining whether or not the statement should be admissible is
how the state "induced" the defendant to make them, the fore-
going analogy between post-plea and post-conviction statements
means little. The post-plea statements are a result of the plea-
an ineffective waiver of trial-and it appears just to place de-
fendant in the position he would have been in if the plea and the
resulting official inquiries had not occurred. But the defendant
who pleads not guilty has not attempted to waive his right to
trial. There is no danger here that the defendant has, through
hope of leniency, "submitted" himself to the state. He was an
adversary at all times. The state has already devoted to him a
full trial, not just an inquiry.127 In the context of "right to a fair
trial," the defendant should be allowed to go to trial unprejudiced
by his statements if the plea is not accepted or is withdrawn. It is
more difficult to see why good evidence should be excluded when
a defendant has taken advantage of his constitutional right to
trial, but his conviction is reversed due to unintentional error at
trial. However, where the error was a constitutional one, it still
can be said that the defendant did not receive the trial he was
entitled to and perhaps he should in all fairness now be given a
trial unhampered by the "fruits" of the state's error.
127. Of course, it may well be that even a conviction at trial was
not fairly obtained by the state and the resulting statements should be
excluded, especially if a retrial is ordered due to a constitutional error.
Even then, however, there may be no logic to using the exclusionary
rule if its purpose is to deter some undesired conduct-as it is highly
unlikely that the judicial error was intentional and, therefore, deter-
rable. Exclusion would have to be based on some sort of "unfairness"
or due process rationale. It comes down to a policy question of how
fair a society must be to an accused.
In absence of constitutional error, however, the problem is more dif-
ficult. A trial is an attempt to ascertain the truth. The defendant
should be punished according to law if he is guilty. Unless there has
been some undesirable conduct on the part of the state which the policy
of the exclusionary rule should deter, all good evidence should be used
against him. So, for example, if a retrial is granted because of "new
evidence" discovered by the defendant, there is not likely to be any
reason for the state not to use post-trial statements.
A close case is where the defendant was convicted because of some
violation by the state of a rule of evidence or a state statute. Here there
can be said to be unfairness on the part of the state resulting in a con-
viction. But, at the same time, if the state is willing to grant a retrial
for violation of state law, it should be within the state's prerogative to
decide on how the retrial is to be governed. It can only be suggested
that if a state believes the unfairness great enough to grant a retrial, it
should allow the defendant to start afresh. It is hesitantly submitted
that, if such statements were used against the defendant, he may claim
he was denied the equal protection guaranteed him by the fourteenth
amendment.
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V. CONCLUSION
The plea of guilty operates as a waiver of trial. At trial the
defendant is presumed innocent and the state must carry the
burden of proving otherwise. All the evidence and the merits of
any defenses should be presented to the jury. The jury would
be made aware of what action constitutes the crime charged as
well as what element of intent is needed to find defendant guilty.
When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty, however, he may be
unaware that he does not have the requisite culpability to be
found guilty of the crime charged, he may be unaware of all
his constitutional rights, or he may have been pressured into
pleading guilty by threats or promises. Since there is to be no
trial, it should be the affirmative duty of the court to ascertain
that the plea of guilty will not result in a miscarriage of justice.
A thorough inquiry by the court, when the plea is entered,
will tend to reduce the number of improvident pleas. When an
improvident plea is accepted, it can be said to be the result of
an inadequate inquiry. The consequences to the defendant of
an improvident plea are slight, however, if he is allowed to with-
draw his plea and proceed to trial unprejudiced by any evidence
obtained against him as a result of the plea.
The majority of courts presently f'orbid the use of the improv-
ident guilty plea as evidence. However, since the prejudice to the
defendant is likely too great to be overcome if the plea is used
against him, the Constitution should protect all defendants from
such prejudice. An improvident plea is actually an ineffective
waiver of a defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial. Since
state and public policy encourage guilty pleas and, therefore,
the waiver of a constitutional right, the state should not, absent
an effective waiver, be allowed to use the plea to make a sham
out of the "trial" awarded to the defendant who has withdrawn
his plea.
Statements made in response to official inquiries following
an improvident plea should not be used as evidence. They are
the result of an ineffective waiver of trial. Although their use is
not as prejudicial as use of the plea itself, the statements are
much more prejudicial to the defendant than admissions made
prior to indictment. Even if the admissions do not reveal the
guilty plea, it is nearly impossible for a defendant to explain
them away without disclosing the circumstances which prompted
them.
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